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I. INTRODUCTION
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held the
Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from banning
1
handguns. Following Heller, application of the Second Amendment
to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment seemed
likely. Although the Amendment’s Framers largely believed it would
require states to uphold the individual liberties outlined in the Bill of
Rights, state governments have not been required to do so following
2
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases.
3
The Court’s grant of certiorari in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
however, could signal a departure from the Slaughter-House
4
precedent. McDonald will consider whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporate the right to keep and bear arms, making the
5
right binding against state governments. If the Court applies the
Second Amendment to the states through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and overturns Slaughter-House, the decision could
throw the existing substantive due process framework into disarray
because many rights would apply through both the Due Process and
6
Privileges or Immunities clauses. The Court, however, may use
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
2. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).
3. McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2010).
4. See Randy Barnett, Predicting McDonald, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Nov. 19, 2009,
http://volokh.com/2009/11/18/predicting-the-mcdonald/ (discussing the implication of certiorari
in McDonald v. Chicago).
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, McDonald, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Jun. 9, 2009).
6. See generally David Kopel, Privilege or Immunity Extravaganza, THE VOLOKH
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McDonald to clarify the existing Privileges or Immunities and Due
7
Process jurisprudence, which is presently in a state of confusion.
Regardless of the specific outcome, McDonald will likely solidify the
legacy of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments on civil
liberties.
II. FACTS
Chicago introduced firearm regulations that effectively banned
8
handguns. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held
that the Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from
9
banning handguns kept at home. Immediately following Heller, Otis
McDonald initiated an action challenging several long-standing
Chicago ordinances that largely banned handgun possession within
city limits. McDonald claimed that the Chicago ordinances violated
his Second Amendment right to bear arms as applied to state and
10
local governments by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
11
Illinois followed Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, a 1982 Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that held that state and local
12
governments are not required to recognize the right to bear arms.
The Seventh Circuit similarly declined to overrule its precedent in
13
Quilici. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine

CONSPIRACY,
Dec.
21,
2009,
http://volokh.com/2009/12/21/privileges-or-immunitiesextravaganza/ (assessing the impact of a revived privileges or immunities clause on substantive
due process).
7. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court should consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
should replace substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence given that the
current form encourages courts to invent new rights).
8. See CHICAGO, ILL., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c), 8-20090(a), 8-20-200(a), 8-20-200(c) (2009) (forbidding possession of any unregistered firearm while
denying registration of most handguns and denying registration of any firearm if the owner fails
to annually register the firearm).
9. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
10. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 16,
2009).
11. NRA v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp.2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The Seventh Circuit
reviewed a district court decision with the NRA as the lead plaintiff. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari to Petitioner McDonald’s claim, instead of the NRA’s case.
12. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (relying on Presser
v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding the Second Amendment applies only to the federal
government and does not subject state regulations to constitutional scrutiny)).
13. See NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit
consolidated Petitioner McDonald’s case with an identical case brought by the NRA, and the
NRA appeared as the lead appellant below.
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whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies
to the states through either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privilege or
Immunities Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
14
Clause.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
If the Court incorporates the Second Amendment, it could do so
either through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause or through the Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In either
case, the Court’s consideration will be influenced by its recent
decision in Heller.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Following the Civil War, proponents of equal rights sought to
create federal protections for fundamental civil liberties. Before the
Civil War, the Supreme Court had opined that fundamental rights
enjoy no federal protection in three separate cases. Corfield v. Coryell
held the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause only creates a
federal cause of action where a state extends a right to its citizens
15
while denying the right to citizens of other states. Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore held that the Bill of Rights does not apply to state
16
governments. Scott v. Sanford, commonly referred to as the Dred
Scott opinion, held that there are two distinct forms of citizenship in
America—state and federal—and states retain discretion in extending
17
fundamental rights to their citizens.
After the war, Northern Republicans sought to remedy the
perceived ills of Corfield, Barron and Dred Scott by creating a federal
18
cause of action around individual liberties. To that end, Congress
conditioned readmission to the Union on the southern states’
19
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite initial optimism

14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at i.
15. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Corfield considered
an Article Four Privileges and Immunities challenge, id., which is distinct from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.
16. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
17. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856).
18. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 41 (1986) (stating that
“perhaps the most common Republican refrain of the Thirty-Ninth Congress was that life,
liberty and property of American citizens must be protected against denial by the states”).
19. Id. at 36 (discussing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment). In pertinent
part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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regarding the Fourteenth Amendment’s ability to safeguard
individual liberties, the Supreme Court quickly decided otherwise. In
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court ruled the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause only protects rights
accruing under federal citizenship, which are distinct from the
20
fundamental rights inherent in state citizenship.
In dicta, the Court in Slaughter-House described the federal rights
codified by the Privileges or Immunities Clause as those “which owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
21
Constitution, or its laws.” These include access to government, the
right to run for elected office, access to seaports, and access to
22
courts. This limited field of rights protected by the Clause falls short
of the fundamental rights envisioned by many of the Amendment’s
23
drafters.
Though explicitly recognizing the historical moment in which the
24
Reconstruction-era amendment was adopted,
Slaughter-House
placed seemingly equal weight on the principle of textual
interpretation that requires explicit language to create federal causes
25
of action against the state governments. Specifically, the Court
explained that for an amendment to shift protection of civil rights
from the States to the Federal government would require “language
26
which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.” This
language directly parallels the pre-Civil War Barron decision in which
27
the Court held the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).
21. Id. at 79.
22. Id.
23. Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2009) (noting most Congressional
representatives understood Privileges or Immunities to encompass “protection by the
Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety”) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546, 551–52 (E.D. PA 1823) (No. 3,230)).
24. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68 (stating that “those who had succeeded in
re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this great act
of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive
. . . and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the
restored Union . . . .”).
25. Id. at 78.
26. Id. at 76–78.
27. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding that if
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Following Slaughter-House, the Court largely reverted back to its
pre-Civil War approach to federalism. In United States v. Cruikshank,
the Court reaffirmed that neither the Second Amendment nor the
Privilege or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit
28
state governments’ power to regulate firearms. As the Court later
explained in Presser v. Illinois, a general right to bear arms is a
fundamental privilege inherent in state citizenship, but the Fourteenth
Amendment only creates federal protection for rights accruing to
29
national citizenship. Because fundamental rights predate the
Constitution, they are not inherent in national citizenship, thus not
30
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For the most part, the Court has upheld a limited view of the
31
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privilege or Immunities Clause. However,
the Court has recently begun to interpret the Clause as protecting
some fundamental rights, perhaps indicating a departure from the
Slaughter-House precedent. In Saenz v. Roe, the Court interpreted the
32
Clause as providing federal protection for the right to travel.
Although Justice Thomas dissented from this opinion, he agreed that
the meaning of the Clause should be reconsidered in “the appropriate
33
case.”
B. Modern Selective Incorporation Through Due Process
Beginning in the 20th century, the Court has increasingly
recognized specific, constitutional rights as binding and protected
from intrusion by both the federal and state government through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Twining v. New
Jersey, the Court recognized the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process clause as a potential source of substantive rights: “It is
possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded against National
action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial
34
35
of them would be a denial of due process.” In Palko v. Connecticut,
Congress had intended to apply Bill of Rights to the states “they would have declared this
purpose in plain and intelligible language”).
28. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553–55 (1876).
29. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1885).
30. Id. at 267.
31. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1940) (stating that “[t]he privileges and
immunities clause protects all citizens against abridgment by states of rights of national
citizenship as distinct from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state citizenship”).
32. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 498, 503 (1999).
33. Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). In Twining, the Court held that the right
to be free of self-incrimination was neither a privilege or immunity of U.S. citizens nor inherent
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the Court established the “selective incorporation” test, which later
provided a vehicle for applying much of the Bill of Rights to state
actions:
[I]mmunities that are valid as against the federal government by
force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the
36
states.

Following Palko, the Court incorporated nearly every right
37
embodied in the first eight Amendments. The Court, however, later
refined Palko’s “concept of ordered liberty” standard, now
incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights if the right is
38
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”
Although Cruikshank’s holding that the Second Amendment
does not apply to the states is specific precedent binding the lower
courts, the Cruikshank decision was written forty-two years prior to
Twining’s recognition that the Due Process Clause could incorporate
the Bill of Rights against the states. The modern Court has yet to
consider whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is fundamental right.
C. District of Columbia v. Heller
In 2008, the Court considered whether a federal law prohibiting
handguns in the District of Columbia violated the Second
39
Amendment. The District of Columbia argued that the Second
Amendment protected the right to bear arms only in connection with
40
militia service.
The respondents, however, asserted that the
Amendment protected an individual right unconnected to militia
41
purposes. In ruling that the right to bear arms accrues to individuals
regardless of militia purposes, the Court first confronted the Second

in due process and therefore could be abridged by the states. Id. at 113-14.
35. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
36. Id. at 324–25 (1937) (emphasis added).
37. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 653
(1989) (stating that “the obvious question, given the modern legal reality of the incorporation of
almost all of the rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments, is
what exactly justifies treating the Second Amendment as the great exception?”).
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787–88 (2008).
40. Id. at 2789 (citing to Amendment’s prefatory clause as indicating purpose to guard
states against federal intervention but not to create an individual right).
41. Id.
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Amendment’s prefatory clause: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State . . . .” The Court held that the
prefatory clause serves a “clarifying function” but does not otherwise
“limit or expand the scope of [the right announced in] the operative
42
clause.” Using this interpretation, and after examining the Second
Amendment’s historical background, the Court held that the Second
Amendment protects a preexisting, individual right to bear arms
43
unconnected with militia purposes.
After recognizing this right, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns. The
Court upheld precedent protecting a right to bear arms commonly
44
used for lawful purposes like self-defense. The Court found the D.C.
law prohibiting an “entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly
chosen by American Society for [the] lawful purpose” of self-defense
45
to be an unconstitutional violation of the Second Amendment. The
Court rested its decision on the popularity of the weapon at issue—a
handgun—and explicitly declined to provide a standard of review for
lower courts to weigh individuals’ Second Amendment rights against
46
a state’s interest in regulating weapons to preserve safety.
IV. HOLDING
The Seventh Circuit held the Second Amendment is not binding
47
on state and local governments. First, the Seventh Circuit quickly
dismissed the prospect of overturning the Slaughter-House Cases by
interpreting the right to bear arms as protected by the Privileges or
48
Immunities clause. Second, the Seventh Circuit declined to hold that
the Second Amendment was binding on state governments through
49
the modern selective incorporation framework. The plaintiffs
acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent—Cruikshank, Presser,
and Miller—rejects the application of the Second Amendment to
42. Id. at 2789.
43. Id. at 2822–23.
44. See id. at 2821–22. See also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939)
(considering whether the Second Amendment contemplated the right to carry a sawed-off
shotgun across state line).
45. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 (“It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the
American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”).
46. Id. at 2821 (“[Justice Breyer] criticizes us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny
for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions . . . . A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judge’s assessments of its usefulness is not constitutional guarantee at all.”).
47. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009).
48. Id. at 857.
49. Id. at 860.
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state governments. Still, they urged the court to engage in Palko’s
51
incorporation analysis and dismiss the precedent as outdated. The
Seventh Circuit, however, rebuffed the plaintiffs’ arguments for
selective incorporation. In doing so the court noted it was bound to
follow specific precedent regardless of whether the analysis was
52
perceived as outdated. It noted Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller
53
remain good law after Heller and that the Supreme Court has not
shown any intention of incorporating all the amendments by
54
overruling Slaughter-House.
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit speculated that despite Heller’s
characterization of the right to bear arms as an individual right, the
right embodied in the Second Amendment may apply differently to
55
state governments than to the federal government. The court offered
two scenarios to support its hypothesis that the right may allow state
governments to act where the federal government could not. First, a
state could decide private ownership of long guns, as opposed to
56
A state ban on
handguns, was best suited for a public militia.
handguns would therefore be permissible under the Seventh Circuit’s
57
interpretation of the Heller decision.
Second, a state could determine the public’s interest in selfdefense is best served by requiring potential victims to surrender and
let the perpetrator face the criminal justice system rather than fight
58
back with handguns. The court explained that Heller created Second
Amendment protection only for the “interests of law-abiding

50. Id. at 857.
51. See id. at 857 (citing Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the
Second Amendment binding against the states through the Due Process Clause)).
52. NRA, 567 F.3d at 857 (citing Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”)).
53. Id. at 858 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008)
(“[W]ith respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation . . . we note that
Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases. Our later
decisions in [Presser and Miller], reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the
Federal Government.”)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 859–60 (“One function of the second amendment is to prevent the national
government from interfering with state militias. It does this by creating individual rights, Heller
holds, but those rights may take a different shape when asserted against a state than against the
national government.”).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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citizens.” According to the Seventh Circuit, if a state banned selfdefense, there would be no right to own a handgun because there
60
would no longer be a lawful purpose for its possession. Regarding
the latter hypothetical, the Seventh Circuit emphasized Heller’s
conclusion that the Second Amendment is only concerned with
61
citizens who follow the law. If a state banned self-defense, there
62
would be no right to own a handgun for purposes of self-defense.
V. ANALYSIS
In holding the Second Amendment does not apply to state
governments, the Seventh Circuit correctly deferred to binding,
specific Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court, however, will
be free to overrule its earlier holdings.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis distorts Heller’s
description of the Second Amendment right, ignores an implicit right
to self-defense, and inappropriately regards federalism principles as
paramount to the right to bear arms.
A.

Specific Supreme Court Precedent.

An alternative approach to the Seventh Circuit’s adherence to
arguably outdated precedent would have been to mimic the approach
63
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke v. King. The Ninth Circuit
justified a departure from precedent by recognizing that the Supreme
Court has yet to address the possibility of incorporating the Second
64
Amendment through the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court’s silence as an opportunity to undergo
65
its own incorporation analysis under the Due Process Clause. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, however, reinterpretation at the circuit court
level is dubious, especially considering three Supreme Court cases
66
directly address the issue at hand.

59. Id. at 859.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009).
64. Id. at 447.
65. Id.
66. See NRA, 576 F.3d at 857 (stating that “repeatedly, in decisions that no one thinks
fossilized, the Justices have directed trial and appellate judges to implement the Supreme
Court’s holdings even if the reasoning in later opinions has undermined their rationale”).
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B. The Right to Bear Arms May Take a Different Shape Against the
States.
The Seventh Circuit’s first hypothetical ignores Heller’s rejection
of the notion that the Second Amendment is limited by its prefatory
67
clause. Indeed, the Court in Heller took great pains to note that the
right to bear arms encompassed much more than gun possession for
68
militia purposes. As the Second Amendment protects firearms used
for a variety of purposes, including hunting and self-defense, an
individual state’s determination of what weapons would best serve
militia purposes is irrelevant. If the prefatory clause was a limitation
on the right, the Heller respondent likely would have been denied the
right to have his handgun because he did not claim its possession for
69
militia service.
The Seventh Circuit’s second hypothetical distorts two of Heller’s
premises. First, Heller employed the “law-abiding citizen” language to
define the types of weapons the Framers intended to protect in
70
codifying the Second Amendment. The Court determined the
Framers contemplated the arms “‘in common use at the time’ for
71
lawful purposes like self-defense.” In defining the protected
category of arms in this manner, the Court created a framework for
adapting the Second Amendment right to the modern world. For
example, Heller does not stand for the proposition that individuals
have a right to own weapons of mass destruction because these
weapons are not currently in common use for lawful purposes.
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court indicate the right to own a
handgun is contingent on a state’s self-defense laws. Although the
majority noted that the ban on handguns amounted to a categorical
prohibition on “an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly
72
chosen for that lawful purpose [of self-defense],” the Court used this
lawful purpose language under the assumption that a government
73
would not and could not ban self-defense. In determining whether

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
defense

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2008).
See id. at 2801.
See id. at 2788.
Id. at 2815–16.
Id. at 2815.
Id. at 2817.
Id. (“As the quotations earlier in this opinion demonstrate, the inherent right of selfhas been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a
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the ability to “bear arms” applies outside of the militia context, the
Court looked to the 18th century understanding of the term and
decided that the phrase was commonly understood to include a right
74
of self-defense. The Court’s historical analysis in Heller of the
Framers’ intent does not condition the individual right on modern,
state-level legislative determinations of whether self-defense is
appropriate.
C. Both Slaughter-House and Federalism Principles Should Guide
the Second Amendment Incorporation
Throughout its opinion, the Seventh Circuit adhered to the
principles of federalism outlined in the Slaughter-House Cases when
deciding whether the Bill of Rights should apply to the states.
Although the circuit court’s deference to Supreme Court precedent is
appropriate, these principles may hold substantially less weight with
the Supreme Court.
First, the Seventh Circuit’s axiom that “[f]ederalism is an older
and more deeply rooted tradition than is a right to carry any
75
particular kind of weapon” stands contrary to Supreme Court
precedent. Heller emphasized the right to bear arms predates the
United States and any of its associated federalism principles: “it has
always been understood that the Second Amendment . . . codified a
pre-existing right . . . . ‘[T]his is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
76
existence.’” Although the Seventh Circuit may be correct in
asserting that the right to own a particular weapon is not “deeply
rooted” in the American scheme of justice, the right to bear arms,
particularly in self-defense, has long been recognized as one of the
fundamental rights through which all other liberties seek their
77
protection.
Beyond the Seventh Circuit’s broad federalism concerns, the court
extends a level of deference to Slaughter-House’s limited view of the
Fourteenth Amendment that may be revised or overruled at the
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for
that lawful purpose.”).
74. Id. at 2793.
75. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009).
76. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 at 2797–98 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
553 (1876)).
77. See Brief for Respondents The Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. in Support of Petitioners
at 32, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 at 2805) (stating right to bear arms may be “true palladium of liberty”).
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Supreme Court level. First, the Supreme Court’s decision to consider
whether Chicago’s handgun ban violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause indicates that the
Court considers the issue undecided. Second, the Court’s recent
decision in Saenz indicates Slaughter-House did not completely strip
78
the Clause of all modern relevance. Justice Thomas’ dissent in Saenz,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, demonstrates a desire to
79
reevaluate the Clause’s meaning. Finally, in an overwhelming
consensus, scholars have argued Slaughter-House was wrong on the
80
day it was decided. This broad coalition, made up of constitutional
scholars from both ends of the political spectrum, has urged the Court
to reject Slaughter-House’s interpretation of the Clause in favor of a
reading that creates a presumption of federal protection around
81
fundamental rights.
D. McDonald’s Argument
In his brief, Petitioner McDonald devoted sixty-five of seventythree pages to his argument that the Court should overrule SlaughterHouse and hold the right to bear arms is a privilege or immunity
82
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald framed this
argument in two stages. First, he argued historical evidence
demonstrates the phrase “privileges or immunities” was commonly
understood to encompass both the right to bear arms as well as many
83
other fundamental rights. Second, McDonald directly confronted
84
Slaughter-House, calling for the Court to reject that line of cases.
McDonald pointed to the Slaughter-House Court’s failure to give
appropriate weight to the historical moment in which the
85
Amendment was adopted and offered a textualist interpretation of
86
the Amendment supporting a more expansive view of the Clause.
After establishing that all involved parties understood the
Fourteenth Amendment to create federal protection around an
78. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510–11 (1999) (holding Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects right to travel).
79. Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. See generally Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 23 (representing a group of eight distinguished constitutional law
professors).
81. Id. at 10.
82. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10.
83. Id. at 9–10.
84. Id. at 42.
85. Id. at 51–52.
86. Id. at 53–54.
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expansive set of liberties, McDonald argued that Slaughter-House was
incorrectly decided and should now be overturned. The brief focused
on Slaughter-House’s holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
87
only protects those rights inherent in federal citizenship. According
to McDonald, the Slaughter-House majority’s request that Congress
more clearly demonstrate an intent to shift protection of civil rights to
the federal government was unnecessary following the Civil War, the
Reconstruction-era amendments, and extensive Congressional debate
88
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s decision to
rest its interpretation almost exclusively on the text—ignoring
contextual evidence to the contrary—struck McDonald as particularly
89
dubious.
Buttressing his historical analysis, McDonald concluded his
argument for overturning Slaughter-House by confronting the case on
90
textualist terms. Slaughter-House’s crucial distinction between
Article IV privileges and immunities of “citizens in the several states”
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities of
“citizens of the United States” was a difference without meaning,
91
according to McDonald. McDonald points both to instances where
Congress used the phrases interchangeably as well as an explicit
92
rejection of the distinction by the Amendment’s primary author. For
McDonald, this interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment privileges
as synonymous with Article IV rights indicates a congressional intent
that the Fourteenth Amendment cloak those Article IV liberties with
93
federal protection.
Finally, McDonald briefly suggested the Court incorporate the
87. Id. at 44.
88. Id. at 51–52.
89. Id. at 50. As McDonald noted, observers have been pointing out this issue since the
19th century, when William Royall wrote:
It is a little remarkable that, so far as the reports disclose, no one of the distinguished
counsel who argued this great case (the Slaughter-House Cases), nor any of the judges
who sat in it, appears to have thought it worthwhile to consult the proceedings of the
Congress which proposed this amendment to ascertain what it was that they were
seeking to accomplish.
William Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, S. L. REV. 558, 563
(1879), quoted in Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10, at 50.
90. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10, at 53–54.
91. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 53–54 (“Bingham specifically rejected the construction SlaughterHouse [sic]
placed on Article IV’s alleged language. ‘There is an ellipsis in the language employed in the
Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States in the several States’ that it guaranties.’”)(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th
Congress, 2nd Sess. 984 (1859)).
93. Id.
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Second Amendment against the states through its existing due
94
McDonald noted selective incorporation
process framework.
typically looks to the right’s “historical acceptance in our nation, its
recognition by the states . . . and the nature of the interest secured by
95
the right.” To demonstrate that the right to bear arms satisfies these
requirements, McDonald first pointed to the “settled” determination
under English law at the time of the Constitution’s ratification that
96
colonial subjects had a right to bear arms for self-defense. Further,
McDonald highlighted the states’ traditional acknowledgement of the
right, emphasizing the fact that forty-four states currently codify the
97
right to keep and bear arms in their constitutions. Finally, McDonald
contended the right to self-defense inherent in the Second
Amendment is a fundamental aspect of the liberty interest protected
98
under the Due Process right to privacy and personal integrity.
E. Chicago’s Argument
In contrast to McDonald, the City of Chicago divided its brief
99
equally between due process and privileges or immunities.
Beginning with its privileges or immunities analysis, the City of
Chicago urged the Court to reject McDonald’s argument for
overturning Slaughter-House. Chicago based its argument on familiar
100
stare decisis principles, arguing the Court should uphold SlaughterHouse because 1) the existing privileges or immunities jurisprudence
is “clear and easy to apply”; 2) it is well-established case law; 3) much
of the Court’s subsequent privilege or immunities and substantive due
process decisions were founded on Slaughter-House; and 4) there has
been no “erosion of legal and factual premises” underlying Slaughter101
House. Regarding the latter contention, Chicago emphasized the
legal and factual foundation of Slaughter-House remains
102
unchanged.
Although most of the Bill of Rights has been
incorporated through substantive due process, Chicago points out that
94. Id. at 66.
95. Id. at 67 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id. at 69.
98. Id. at 70–72 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), (recognizing
personal autonomy in medical decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
(recognizing right to purchase contraception as part of right of personal security); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), (recognizing right of bodily integrity against police searches)).
99. Brief for Respondents, McDonald, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2009).
100. Id. at 42.
101. Id. at 46–52.
102. Id. at 51–53.
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the Court has repeatedly emphasized the Privileges or Immunities
103
Clause does not apply to state governments. In addition, Chicago
argued the Court’s historical understanding of the Congressional
104
debate around the Fourteenth Amendment remains unchanged.
Chicago also argued the Court should decline to overturn
Slaughter-House even if reviewing the decision de novo —outside of
the Cruikshank, Presser, Miller precedent where the Court previously
105
held the Second Amendment did not apply to state governments.
First, Chicago pointed to the Court’s decision in Barron, in which the
Court held that the term “privileges and immunities” did not apply to
106
the states. To Chicago, widely recognized Supreme Court precedent
demonstrated that, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
passage, the general public did not understand the Privileges or
107
Immunities Clause to bind the state governments. To these same
ends, Chicago reiterated Slaughter-House’s guiding principle that if
Congress had intended to work such a fundamental change in the
108
Clause’s nature, the legislators would have explicitly done so.
Chicago started its substantive due process analysis by reminding
the Court of Barron’s rejection of wholesale incorporation of the Bill
of Rights. Chicago argued that the Court in Palko only intended for
incorporation when a particular substantive right is “implicit in the
109
concept of ordered liberty.” Pointing to extensive handgun violence
in urban areas like Chicago, the city argued prohibition or regulation
110
of handguns preserves rather than hinders ordered liberty.
Incorporating the Second Amendment would endanger virtually
111
every state-level gun regulation. Even if existing gun regulations
were held constitutional under the Second Amendment, challenges to
112
these laws would prove costly for states to litigate.
To demonstrate the fundamental changes that would result from
incorporation of the Second Amendment, Chicago highlighted the
differences between Heller’s application of the Second Amendment

103. Id. at 52.
104. Id. at 52–53.
105. Id. at 53.
106. Id. at 54.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 55–57.
109. Id. at 8 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
110. Id. at 12–17.
111. Id. at 17–23.
112. Id. at 19–20 (explaining state governments would be forced to defend existing
regulations against a new, federal cause of action).
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to the federal government and the nature of existing gun rights
113
embodied in state constitutions. In particular, Chicago emphasized
Heller’s lack of an explicit level of review conflicts with the state-level
“consensus” that any right to firearms is subject to a careful weighing
of an individual’s interest in gun ownership against the government’s
114
interest in preserving safety. Furthermore, state governments and
local municipalities have occasionally banned handguns in certain
115
areas while allowing possession of other firearms. This, according to
Chicago, conflicts with Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment
always protects handgun possession where other firearms are
116
allowed.
VI. DISPOSITION
Chicago’s novel arguments against applying the Second
Amendment to the states may eventually prove unpersuasive. First,
the City misconstrues Palko’s “implicit in the concept of ordered
117
liberty” standard. The Court’s substantive due process precedent
seeks to place federal protection around rights inherent in all free
118
societies. While a ban on handguns could prevent violence and
therefore increase “order” in Chicago’s urban areas, Chicago fails to
demonstrate why the right to bear arms does not advance ordered
liberty.
The Court might reject Chicago’s assertion that the historical
record following Barron does not indicate a changed understanding
of “privileges” and “immunities” such that the Clause now protects
both fundamental rights and rights of national citizenship. The Court
did not recognize a distinction between fundamental and national
119
rights until the Dred Scott decision, twenty-four years after Barron.

113. Id. at 24.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 26–30.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id. at 8 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
118. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (noting modern substantive due
process doctrine rests on “the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the
incorporated rights] were sacrificed”).
119. In Scott v. Sanford, the Court held:
[N]o State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest
him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal
Government, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would
undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and
immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856).
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The subsequent Civil War and explicit rejection of Dred Scott in the
Fourteenth Amendment indicate the popular understanding of the
deference extended to states’ rights, including the Privileges or
Immunities framework, had likely changed by the time of the
Amendment’s adoption.
The Court, however, might also find McDonald’s argument for
reviving Privileges or Immunities unpersuasive. Even if the SlaughterHouse majority’s textualist interpretation was misguided and more
weight should have been given to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Congressional debate and historical context, the Court might not
heed the legal academy’s persistent calls to overturn Slaughter120
House. Doing so would prioritize federal citizenship over state-level
citizenship and fundamentally change the current federalism structure
of our Nation’s legal system. The Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt
a holding that would radically change the federal-state balance of
power. In the area of incorporation, the Court is even less likely to do
so because modern, substantive due process review has extended
federal protection to many fundamental rights that have not been
covered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The most likely outcome of McDonald will be incorporation of
the Second Amendment under the Court’s existing due process
jurisprudence. The Court might also provide an interest-balancing test
for state courts to evaluate Second Amendment challenges to gun
121
regulations. McDonald’s most lasting contribution might be to
finally seal the fate of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The Court will likely interpret the Clause much
the same as Slaughter-House’s initial construction—as a protector
solely of a very limited penumbra of rights inherent in federal
citizenship. In the wake of McDonald, advocates for increased federal
protection of fundamental rights will likely have to look outside the
Privileges or Immunities Clause for their constitutional mandate.

120. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that there is “a
remarkable scholarly consensus” that “the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to protect substantive, fundamental rights”).
121. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (declining to adopt a
standard of review for federal gun regulations in spite of Justice Breyer’s requests for a test).

